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Abstract
Authentication and Privacy are important concerns in current low power wireless devices
like RFID and u-sensors. u-sensors are low power devices which have been identified as
being useful in variety of domains including battlefield and perimeter defense etc.
Radio-
Frequency Identification (RFID) is a technology for automated identification of objects
and people. An RFID device frequently called RFID tag is a small microchip device that
holds limited amount of data and transmits the same over the various frequency ranges.
An RFID tag is typically attached to an item and contain identification information like
serial numbers unique to that item. RFID tags are recently being used in several
application areas like inventory management, medicines and security systems etc.
Since sensors are deployed in an unattended hostile environment, they are vulnerable to
various kinds of attacks. An adversary can pose insider or outsider attacks into the
network with the goal of both deceiving the base station and depleting the resources of
the relaying nodes. Authentication schemes are implemented that will enable base station
to detect any false data transmission. RFIDs, on the other hand pose two main security
concerns for users: clandestine tracking and inventorying. RFID tags respond to reader
interrogation without alerting their owners or bearers. Thus, where read range permits
clandestine scanning of tags is a plausible threat.
Security requirements in both of these low power devices are comprised of
authentication, integrity, privacy and anti-playback. The recipient of the message needs to
be able to unequivocally assure that the message came from its stated source. Similarly,
the recipient needs to be assured that the message was not altered in transit and that it is
not an earlier message being re-played in order to veil the current environment. Finally,
all communications needs to be kept private such that eavesdroppers cannot intercept
study and analyze, and devise countermeasures to circumvent the purposes of the sensor
network.
This thesis implements authentication schemes in u-sensors that will detect false injection
of data into the communication path of the base station and sensors. In addition to that
this thesis focuses on an application of RFIDs deployed in library application. Discusses
the privacy and authentication issues in RFID tags particularly in the library domain.
Describes an authentication scheme implementation to handle these vulnerabilities .
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This Chapter will introduce RFIDs and u-Sensors and focus on related research work
done in the area ofprivacy and authentication for these low power wireless devices.
1.1 RFIDs and u.-Sensors
Figure 1.1: Various aspects ofRFID
RFID tags are small, wireless devices that help identify objects and people. These
tags respond to reader interrogation without alerting their owners or bearers. Most of
these tags are passive and powered up only when within a range of a reader. However,
some expensive RFID tags that have built-in batteries as well. In case of RFIDs, where
read range permits, clandestine scanning of tags is a plausible threat to this system. These
are tags consist of few gates and are incapable of perfroming high-level computations.
Most of these RFID tags, even those with cryptographic algorithms, emit unique
identifiers that provide a ready vehicle for physical tracking. Figure 1.1 shows the various
aspects of RFIDs. Storage, cost and computation etc indicate the constraints on today's
RFIDs. Blocker tag, Faraday cage, read Password etc shows the enhancements added to
overcome these constraints. Applications in the area ofmedicine, inventory management
etc are also shown in this figure.
WSNs consist of thousands of nodes. These networks consist of a centralized
system known as the base station or the sink and several other low power nodes. In
occurence of an event, these nodes communicate with each other in a multihop approach.
Sensor networks suffer from several limitations such as computational capability, storage
and battery life. These limitations pose a security challenge in sensor network
deployment. For instance, limited storage and computational capaibility may prevent the
use ofhigh-level encryption algorithms in these sensor nodes.
1.2 RelatedWork
Significant research has been carried out in the areas of Privacy and
Authentication in Low Power Devices. In the following text, related work applicable to
u-Sensors and RFIDs will be summarized.
1.2.1 Research in u-Sensors
The current proposals for authenticated broadcasts are impractical for sensor
networks. These schemes rely on asymmetric digital signatures that are impractical for
several reasons. Firstly, long signatures are required resulting in huge communication
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overhead of 50-1000 bytes per packet [2]. Perrig et al [6], proposal for broadcast
authentication does not support limited computing environment because it authenticates
the initial packet with a digital signature that are too expensive to compute on sensor
nodes. He also suggested u-TESLA for base station broadcast authentication, based on
one way key chains and delayed key disclosure. Zhu et al [4] presented a scheme also
based on one-way key chains for broadcast (one-hop) authentication with the goal of
enabling passive participation in sensor networks. Although this scheme is, secure against
outsider attack it is vulnerable to insider attacks in which an adversary needs to
compromise just one node to inject false data into the network shown in Fig2. Ye et al.
[5] proposed a statistical en-route detection scheme, which allows both the base station
































o o o o
Figure1.2: An Example of a sensor network
Protocol demonstrated in [3], suffers from a very low overhead. It presents an
efficient authentication scheme that will prevent false data injection in the sensor
network. Here, t+1 (t
=
system defined security threshold) have to agree on a report
before it is sent to the base station. In addition, all nodes that are responsible for relaying
the report to the base station authenticate the report. This scheme also uses u-TESLA as a
mechanism to authenticate message broadcast from the base station.
1.2.1 Research in RFIDs
Several privacy protection schemes have been proposed for solving privacy and
authentication problems in the area of RFIDs. Sarma, Weis, and Engels [9] propose the
idea of effacing unique identifiers in tags at the point of sale to address tracking problem,
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but retaining product-type identifiers for later use. Inoue and Yasuura [10], suggests that
consumers be equipped to relabel tags with new identifiers, but that old tag identifiers
remain subject to re-activation for later public use. The above approaches of effacement
of unique identifiers fail to eliminate the threat of clandestine inventorying. Unlike
supply-chain RFID, library RFID requires item-level tagging, thereby raising patron
privacy issues. There has been various related works to ensure privacy in library RFID.
Juels, Rivest, and Szydlo [11] propose a device called a "blocker-tag". The blocker tag
exploits the tree-walking collision-avoidance protocol of 915MHz EPC tags to
"block"
readers attempting to read tags of a consumer. However, library RFID works at
13.56MHz bandwidth and thus cannot implement this tree-walking protocol. Weis et al
focus on a broad range of security and privacy issues in the RFID space [12], their
protocol is focussed against passive eavesdroppers and is based on 915MHz tags. Their
scheme also requires reader computations linear in the number of secrets. Abadi and
Fournet [13] propose a private authentication scheme that is based on public-key
cryptography incurs computational overhead on these low power RFID tags.
Molnar and Wagner [14] propose tree-based private authentication scheme that
uses prudent key management that allows revealing of tag identity only to authorized
readers. However, their scheme suffers from couple of drawbacks. Firstly, their scheme
creates an overlap amongst the keys such that after some
time the adversary will be able
to depict the keys used for the authentication scheme. Secondly, it fails to handle change
of ownership. For instance, a book donated to some other library will require a change in
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ownership. Thirdly, their scheme requires at least three rounds of communication
between and tag and reader. The scheme proposed in [15] assumes the existence of a
trusted center that acts as the centralized database of all the secrets and tags in the system.
The trusted center enforces and specifies the privacy policy associated with each tag in
the system. The tag needs to provide support for symmetric key cryptography and needs
to have a random number generator. This scheme is pseudonym based. This scheme has
features like scalability, decoding of pseudonyms and time limited delegation.
However, this scheme does not handle eavesdropping in the forward channel that
leads to malicious traceability. In [16], the use of noisy tags is suggested that generate
noise in the public channel between the reader and the queried tag, such that an
eavesdropper cannot differentiate the messages sent by the queried tag from the ones sent
by the noisy tag. Additionally, solutions for detecting relay attacks are not demonstrated
in scheme [15]. Paper [17] proposes the use of timing based protocol that assumes the use
of extremely low latency communication channel between the reader and a tag and helps
to detect man-in the middle attacks posed on a RFID system.
1.3 Thesis Outline
The thesis will consist of the following six chapters.The first chapter provides
introduction and related work in the area ofRFID and u-sensors along with the rest of the
thesis outline. The second chapter provides detailed explanation of u-sensors, their
current security challenges and summary
of Sencun's [3] hop-by-hop interleaved
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authentication scheme. It also provides a brief tutorial on TOSSIM used as a tool to
perform simulation of these algorithms. Chapter 3 provides a detailed explanation of
RFID systems and particularly focuses on current security challenges in library RFID
system. It proposes a security scheme for library RFID system. Chapter 4 shows the
implementation details of u- sensors. Chapter 5 demonstrates the authentication scheme
implementation in library RFID system along with graphs and figures. Finally, the thesis
will be concluded in chapter 6.
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Chapter 2 Authentication in ^-Sensors
This Chapter describes current security issues in WSNs and also describes Sencun's [3]
interleaved hop-by-hop authentication scheme. In addition, it also goes through
explanation on discrete event simulator TOSSIM. TOSSIM is used as a tool to implement
these algorithms.
2.1 Background in p>Sensors
WSNs consist of thousands of low cost nodes that either have a fixed location or
randomly deployed to monitor the environment. Due to their small size, they have a
number of limitations. Sensors usually communicate with each other using a multi-hop
approach. The flow of data ends at special nodes called base stations. A base station (BS)
links one sensor-network to another to disseminate the data sensed for further processing.
They have enhanced capabilities over simple sensor nodes as they perform complex data
processing. Thus, Authentication is required during both uplink (sensor to base station)
and downlink (base station to sensors) communication.
Sensor networks are often used in mission critical environments such as in
military and healthcare applications.
These applications have very high security
requirements. However, there are certain limitations of the sensor nodes that complicate
the security design and deployment
of sensor networks. When sensor networks are
deployed in remote or hostile environments, it is very difficult to protect them from
physical attacks. An adversary could capture a sensor node and introduce malicious
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nodes into the network. Thus, it can compromise sensitive information that is stored on
compromised nodes or is forwarded through the adversary's nodes to the next hop. In
order to avoid such attacks, resilient sensor networks must be designed which can sustain
even if subset of nodes is compromised. Sometimes sensor nodes are deployed without
prior information of the sensor network topology. To support this randomness of network
topology key agreement protocols need to be designed that will not require certain nodes
to be neighbors of other nodes, and will not require encryption keys to be stored on
sensor before deployment. Appropriate key distribution algorithms are designed along a
flexible WSN architecture to securely provide encryption keys in real time. Sensor nodes
are typically battery-driven. Once deployed, it is difficult to replace or recharge batteries.
Power limitations greatly affect the security of WSNs since encryption algorithms
introduce a communication overhead between the nodes. Symmetric encryption
algorithms are used to secure sensor nodes communication, since asymmetric encryption
methods have high computational requirements. In addition, security algorithms are
needed which will verify and establish trust among nodes participating in a
communication. Limited storage capability in the sensor nodes affects the storage of
cryptographic keys.
2.2 The Authentication scheme
The unattended nature of sensor networks lends itself to several attacks from the
advisory. For example, entire sensor network could be destroyed or attacks could be
launched to deplete the sensor network of its resources or false data can be injected into
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the network via compromised sensors. Sencun and Peng Ning [3] proposed a scheme to
detect false injection of data into the network. This scheme allows the base station to
verify the authenticity of a report that it receives from all the nodes in the network as long
as the number of nodes compromised does not exceed a certain threshold value (t) set by
the network. It also attempts to filter out data packets injected into the network by
compromised nodes before they reach the base station, thus saving the energy that would
have been consumed relaying false data. This algorithm will make sure that false data is








Figure 2.1: Model of the network
The algorithm has five main phases, the description of these phases are as follows:






In the node initialization and deployment phase, the key controller assigns every
node in the network with unique identification number and loads necessary keying
materials that the nodes need to establish a multi-hop pair-wise key with the each of its
neighbors. During the deployment phase, the nodes are deployed into the network and
they start establishing these multi-hop pairwise keys with its neighbors.
During association phase, each node discovers the IDs of its associated nodes.
This process could be initiated by the base station periodically or by a node that detects
the failure of a neighboring node. First, the nodes in the network discover the IDs of the
upper associated (UA) nodes. Here the base station send a HELLO message that is
recursively forwarded across all the nodes in the network. Every node will discover the
IDs of atleast t+1 closest nodes on this path to the base station. Whenever a node receives
a HELLO message, it attaches its ID to it before rebroadcasting the message to the next
node. However, the scheme restricts the number of node IDs associated to HELLO
message to a maximum of t+1 nodes. When the HELLO message reaches the cluster
head, it needs to send an ACK signal back to the base station. In this manner, the nodes
discover the IDs of its lower associated (LA) nodes. The sending of the ACK signal
follows the same process as the sending of the HELLO message from the base station
except, the ACK will be associated with the IDs of LA nodes which again should not
exceed the t+1 limit.
In report endorsement phase, sensor nodes create a report when triggered by an
event. It requires t+1 node to generate a report collaboratively when an event is detected.
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Every participating node computes two MACs over the event, one using its key shared
with the Base station and the other using its pair-wise key shared with its upper
associated node. The first node to detect an event is usually assumed the cluster node.
The cluster node sends the created MACs to the cluster head. The cluster head collects
atleast t+1 MACs from its neighboring nodes before it verifies and combines these MACs
into one report and forwards it to the base station.
In en-route filtering phase, every forwarding node verifies the MAC computed by
its lower association node. If a particular node, for example node y, receives a report
from a downstream node, it should see atleast t+1 PMACs associated with that report. It
verifies the last PMAC in the list based on the pairwise key it shares with the LA node. If
the verification fails, it drops the report. If however, the verification succeeds and if node
y < t+1 hops away from the base station it computes a new PMAC over the event and
attaches it to the list of the PMACs. But if node y > t+1 hops away from the base station
it attaches the new PMAC calculated and removes the last PMAC from the list before
sending it to the next en-route node in the network. Likewise, all en-route nodes get to
verify the authenticity of the report before it reaches the base station.
Finally, the report reaches the BS. It then verifies the report after receiving it. It
computes the t+1 MACs using the authentication keys of the IDs of the nodes associated
with the report. It then compares the calculated MACs with the PMACs in the report. If
the two MACs match, it accepts the report or else rejects it.
20
2.3 TOSSIM
TOSSIM [7] captures the behavior and interactions of networks of thousands of
TinyOS motes at network bit granularity. It provides a powerful abstraction of wireless
networks. TOSSIM takes advantage of TinyOS structure and whole system compilation
to generate discrete-event simulations directly from it. Therefore, emables running
TinyOS code that runs on sensor network hardware. By replacing a few low-level
components, it translates hardware interrupts into discrete simulator events. The
simulator event queue delivers the interrupts that drives the execution of TinyOS
applications. The remainder ofTinyOS code runs unchanged.
TOSSIM allows users to debug, test and analyze algorithms in controlled and
repeatable environment. Users can examine their codes, use debuggers and other
development tools provided by TOSSIM. Its primary goal is to provide high fidelity
simulation environment for Tiny OS applications. Therefore, instead of compiling any
Tiny OS application for a mote, the user can compile them in its framework, which runs
on a PC.
Following are the characteristics ofTOSSIM:
Fidelity: TOSSIM capture network behavior at a very low level. It simulates the
network at bit level, captures individual ADC capture and every interrupt systems
in the network.
Time: Interrupts are timed precisely by TOSSIM because it performs b-level
radio simulations. However, it does not have the capability to model execution
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time. It enables instantaneous running of programs and maintains 4MHz
granularity of time.
Models: It provides abstraction of real world phenomena and remains flexible to
the needs of its users by making complex simulations exterior to the simulations.
The following are the models provided by TOSSIM.
- Radio: This model provides abstraction of directed independent bit errors
between two nodes. An external program can provide a desired radio
model and map it to these bit errors. These directed bit error rates permits
easy modeling of asymmetric links.
Power/Energy: TOSSIM does not model power draw or energy
consumption. However, it allows adding annotations to components that
consume power to provide information on when their power state
changed. Once the simulation has finished running user can apply energy
or power model to these transitions and determine overall energy
consumption.
Building: TOSSIM builds directly on TinyOS code. So in order to run a protocol
or system we need to write a TinyOS implementation of it.
Imperfections: TOSSIM captures behavior at a very low level while making
several simplifying assumptions. TOSSIM
interrupts are non-preemptive because
it is a discrete event simulator. On a real mote, interrupts can fire while other code
is running. If pre-emption can put a mote in unrecoverable state, then simulated
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motes will run without mishap while real motes may fail. In addition, if interrupt
handlers run too long, a real mote may crash whereas since TOSSIM runs the
code instantaneously no problem might appear during simulations.
Networking: TOSSIM simulates 40Kbit RFM mica networking stack, including
the MAC, encoding, timing, and synchronous acknowledgements.
Authority: From real-world deployments, it has been seen that TinyOS networks
have very complex and highly variable behavior. While TOSSIM provides a good
comparison of various algorithms, its results should not be considered
authoritative, as it does not simulate the real world.
2.3.1 NetworkMonitoring and Packet Injection
To interact with a simulated network standard Tiny OS interface tool,
SerialForwarder can be used. To work in TOSSIM environment SerialForwarder's input
source must be set appropriately. TOSSIM provides two modes of serial communication
through serial port to mote 0 and network snooping. The serial port mode, interacts with
mote 0 over the serial port, thus programs connecting to SerialForwarder can send and
receive messages to and from mote 0 respectively. The snooping mode sits on top of the
network model. Programs connecting to SerialForwarder, can hear every radio message
sent in the network and can inject radio messages to arrive at any mote without any error.
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2.3.2 Radio Models
TOSSIM provides two radio models: simple and lossy. In TOSSIM, network
signal is either 1 or 0. All signals are of equal strength, and collision is modeled as logical
or there is no cancellation. Therefore, distance does not affect signal strength.
The
"simple"
radio model places all nodes in a single cell. Every bit transmitted is
received without error. Although no bits are corrupted due to error, two motes can
transmit at the same time. Every mote in the cell will hear the overlap of the signals,
which almost certainly are corrupted packets. This model is used for testing single-hop
algorithms and components for correctness.
The
"lossy"
model places all nodes in a directed graph. Each edge (a,b) in the
graph means a's signal can be heard from b. Each edge has an assigned value in the range
(0,1), representing the probability of a bit sent from
'A'
will be corrupted when
'B'
hears
it. The graph of the lossy model can be specified at TOSSIM boot with a file. TOSSIM
looks for the file
"lossy.nss"
by default, but an alternate file can be specified with the -rf
flag. The file has the following format:
<mote ID>:<mote ID>:bit error rate
<mote ID>:<mote ID>:bit error rate






specifies that mote 1 hears mote 0 with a bit error rate of 1
.2%, mote 0 hears mote 1 with
a bit error rate of 0.9%, and mote 2 hears mote 1 with a bit error rate of 1 .3%. By making
the graph directed, TOSSIM can model asymmetric links.
2.3.3 ADC Models
TOSSIM provides two ADC Models: random and generic. The model chosen
specifies how readings taken from the ADC are generated. The model chosen specifies
how readings taken from the ADC are generated. When channel in the ADC is samples in
random model, it returns a 10-bit random value. The generic model provides random
values by default. The external applications that actuate the lossy network model can also
actuate the generic ADC model using the TOSSIM control channel, setting the value for
any ADC port on any mote. This feature is currently supported by TinyViz (visualization
and actuation environment for TOSSIM) through its ADC plug-in. Figure 2.2 shows a
screenshot of this TinyViz functionality.
2.3.4 TinyViz
TinyViz is a Java visualization and actuation environment for TOSSIM. It can be
attached to a running simulation so that it can capture all the events in a simulation. In
fact, TOSSIM can be made to wait before a TinyViz application starts, with the -GUI
flag. TinyViz by itself draws motes and their LEDs, it is a framework in which plug-in
can provide desired functionality, for example, one of the plug-in is the one that
25
visualizes network traffic. Users can write their own plug-in which TinyViz can
dynamically load.
I If Mir-jtn I .> 11*
> \> j
4 '





Figure2.2: An Example ofTinyViz output adopted from [19]
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Chapter 3 Implementation of ^-Sensors Authentication
Scheme
This chapter investigates the hop-by-hop authentication scheme that filters false data
injected into sensor networks. This scheme was proposed by Sencun Zhu, Sanjeev Setia,
Sushil Jajodia, and Peng Ning [3]. This scheme focuses on insider attacks also known as
false data injection attack. This scheme makes sure that false data is not transmitted
across the network for not more than t+1 nodes by filtering the corrupted data out before
it reaches the base station. These simulations were done using TOSSIM.
3.1 Implementation Details
These are the assumptions made for the implementation of this authentication scheme:
All nodes are assumed to have enough storage space for their keying materials
These nodes share a secret predetermined master key and know their neighbors
These nodes establish multi-hop pair-wise keys with its neighbors
All links are bi-directional
uTESLA scheme implemented to authenticate messages broadcast from the base
station.
The base station will not be compromised.
The security is based on detecting false data generated by comprised nodes. The
security is based on t, which is the threshold value of compromised nodes. The cluster
must have t+1 nodes in order for this scheme to be true. For example, if there were three
(3) cluster nodes plus one CH, the maximum t value would be three. There are also t+1
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delivery nodes. A delivery node sends the data from the CH to the base station. Figure
3.1 helps to display the difference. The nodes U8 thought Ul are the transmission nodes.
CH is the CH, BS is the base station, vl, v2, and v3 are the cluster nodes. The lines show
the upper and lower associations for each node.
OOOOOO O O
Ul 12 V3 14 15 16
Intermediate Nodes
Figure 3.1: Simulation of the network
An example of this scheme would be to have a cluster of 10 nodes plus the CH.
The threshold value (t) will be 5. Therefore, if 3 cluster nodes register an event, they will
be discarded. Once 5 or more cluster nodes register the event, and then the event is
verified by the CH and sent back to the base station. All the five phases of the
authentication scheme initialization, association discovery , report endorsement, en-route
filtering and base station verification as described in previou chapter are implemented
using TOSSIM.
3.2 Simulation
The simulation graphs have been generated using TinyViz a GUI provided for
TOSSIM. Figure 3.2, shows the base station initiating the discovery phase by sending a
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HELLO message. HELLO message is recursively forwarded across all nodes in the
network. In Figure 3.3, the sending of the ACK message is demonstrated using TinyViz.
This way the nodes discover the IDs ofboth LA and UA nodes.
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Figure 3.3: CH sending ACK signal back to BS
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Figure 3.4: En-route filtering phase and Base station verification phase
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The above figure 3.4 shows the en-route filtering phase where the report is verified by
each node in the network and is forwarded to the next node and finally reaching the base
station.
All the simulation results are shown in the appendix section of this document.
Appendix A shows the results of the simulation where only USR1 debug messages are
listed. These messages show when each node broadcasts an event, or sends an
acknowledgement. Appendix B shows the simulation of usr2 messages. These messages
show all of the key computations and events where the MAC is computed to determine
the data authenticity. Appendix C shows the simulation of AM message. This shows
everything that will be sent over the radio waves. The counter in these results shows the
number of times a specific node broadcasts to the cluster. Appendix D shows USR1 and
USR2 messages combined and Appendix E is shows the combined simulation ofUSR1,
USR2, and AM messages.
3.3 Performance Evaluation
The computational overhead of our scheme is mostly due to establishing
pair-wise
keys and report authentication phase. Two associated nodes establish multi-hop pair-wise
keys based on their ids. The cluster node computes one pairwise key and intermediate
nodes compute two pairwise keys. However, the cost of computing these keys does not
cause much overhead and is efficient for these low power sensor nodes. Report
authentication scheme requires the computaion of the MACs by both cluster nodes and
the enroute nodes. This computation of MACs incurs additional compuational costs.
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Nevertheless, this scheme saves the energy of the network by early detection and filtering
of false data from the network.
Communication overhead is incurred during report endorsement phase when the
MACs are transmitted across enroute nodes. Limiting the number of enroute nodes
required to veridy the authenticity of the report can help reduce this overhead. Also, the
en-route filtering phase capability could be turned ON and OFF as per required. This is
usually performned by the base station. When a false report is detected, the en-route
filtering capability can be turned ON or else can be kept turned OFF. An additional
overhead is observed during association discovery phase when the base station sends a
HELLO message and the CH sends ACK signal back.
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Chapter 4 RFIDs for Library
This Chapter will introduce an example ofRFIDs deployment in library, also indicate the
vulnerabilities in today's library RFIDs, and describe the authentication scheme
implemented to handle these vulnerabilities.
4.1 Library RFIDs
Most recently, libraries have started to tag their item using RFID tags. Library
RFID, unlike supply chain RFID, requires item-level tagging, thereby raising patron
privacy issues. They were introduced to relieve repitive strain injury and make
comprehensive inventorying and self-checkout possible. Libraries make use of a
bibliographic database to track circulation information about items in a collection. Each
book, upon being acquired by the library is assigned a unique number, called barcode.
When checkout occurs the bar code is read and the status of the book is changed to
"checked-out"
in the bibliographic database. Depending on the vendor, the security check
is achieved in atleast two ways. One method is to store the status of the book in the tag; a
specific bit, often called a
"security-bit,"
reveals whether the book is checked in or
checked out. It is important to note that the security bit doesn't necessarily affect whether
the tag can be read. The security bit must be correctly set at every check-in and check
out, or else false alarms may be triggered. Second method does not store the circulation
status on the tag. Instead, the readers query the bibliographic database for the circulation
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status of the book as it passes through the exit sensors; this introduces issues of latency
due to query time.
4.2 Attacks on Current library RFID Architectures
Current library RFID deployments suffer from serious vulnerabilities that compromise
individual's privady.
4.2.1 Static tag data and no access control
The identifier attached to RFID tag never changes throughout the lifetime of the
tag. Firstly, the adversary may determine which library owns the book and infer the
origin of the person carrying the book.
Secondly, the use of static identifiers makes tracking and hotlisting possible.The
adversary can track a particular book by co-relating multiple observations of the
books'
s
RFID tag. In hotlisting, the adversary has a hotlist of books in advance that it wishes to
recognize, which enables it to gather information about individual's reading habits and
other personal information.
4.2.2 Collision-Avoidance IDs
Most of the RFID tags are identified uniquely by their radio behavior. In
particular, many tags use a globally unique and static collision ID as a part of their
collision-avoidance protocol. This kind of feature allow unauthorized readers to
determine the tag's identity merely though its collision avoidance behavior.
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4.2.3 WriteLocks and Security Bit Denial of Service
Most of the current RFID specifications provide write protesction algorithms that




command but do not have an
"unlock"
command. Any reader can't unlock a page of
memory when it is locked. The page containing the security-bit needs to be unlocked
when a book is checked-in or checked-out. An adversary can set the status of the security
bit to "not
checked-out"
and lock the page of the memory. Once locked, the RFID tag
cant be unlocked thus making it unusable for the rest of its life and requiring a physical
replacement of the tag. This phenomenon is known as security bit denial-of service.
4.2.4 Tag Password Management
Current RFID specifications provide two approaches for tag password
management. Firstly, all tags share the same password and secondly each tag has its own
password. All tags sharing the same password would mean if a tag is compromised the
entire system will be compromised. On the other hand, if each tag has its own password
then it would require a mechanism to cross-reference a password to a tag. This inturn
would require the use of index tables and global identifers. Use of global identifiers
would intrun lead to tracking and hotlisting.
4.2.5 Passive RFID tags
Most of the RFID tags are passive that is they are powered up only when they are
withing a range of a reader. This kind of communication between a reader and a tag
35
provides a possibility for a third party to eavesdrop on the signals transmitted between the
reader and a tag thus leading to unauthorized access to the tag.
4.3 RFID Library Protocol
The main goal of this protocol is to allow authorized readers to identify and
authenticate the RFID tag, while preventing unauthorized readers from determining
anything about the identity of tags. The protocol deals with single reader and multiple tag
and suggest security schemes to deal with man-in the middle attack, terrorist fraud and
mafia fraud using noisy tags, blocker tags and distance bounding protocol.














This scheme assumes the existence of a central trusted entity, which is called the
trusted center (TC). The TC is the owner of all tags and secrets in the system. It enforces
and specifies the privacy policy associated with a tag. The tag needs to provide support
for symmetric key cryptography and need to have random number generator. When a
new tag is created, it is enrolled into the system, it is loaded with a secret key generated
for it by the TC.
The TC assigns secret keys with the help of various cryptographic functions like,




and a pseudo-random generator
(PRG) G: K -> K x K. Where, G o (k) and Gi (k) is used to denote first and second part of
G (k), respectively, such that G (k)
=
(G0 (k), Gi (k)). PRG is defined in terms of PRF,
for instance defining G by Gb (k)
= Fk (0n"]b), so that the tag needs only single
cryptographic primitive.
When a reader queries a tag, the tag returns a randomly generated number to it. The
TC can decode this number, send the tag identity to the reader, after verfyinf the
authenticity of the reader.
4.4 Tag Access
Each node in the tree has its own k-bit secret key. This authentication scheme is
based on a complete binary tree {0,
l}-d
. As described in figure 4.2, the first di levels of
the tree contain node secrets that are chosen uniformly and independently at random by
the TC during system initialization. Each node at depth di corresponds to a unique tag.
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When the tag is enrolled into the system, it receives all keys on the path from its node to
the root. Thus, each tag only needs capacity to store di secrets.
d, = Tag depth
d2= Depth of tree of secrets
o oo
Figure 4.2: Tree of secrets
The next d2 levels of the tree contain tree of secrets associated with each tag in the
RFID system.
4.4.1 Tag responses
Each tag T keeps a counter T.c. The counter identifies a leaf at level d of the tree;
thus each counter value corresponds to a new pseudonym for this tag. The tag responds to
a query from a reader by generating a random number r and sending a pseudonym
(r,p)
=
(r, (Fh(ci...i)(r), Fh(cl...2)(r), ...., Fh(ci...d)(r)))
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where h (ci....j ) values represent secrets along the path in the tree of secrets from the root
to the tag's current leaf T.c. The tag increments its counter c after it sends the secrets to
the reader. Since the counter c is incremented on each query, the tag will use a different
path of secrets, and therefore a different pseudonym, for every query.
4.4.2 Decoding Pseudonyms
Given a pseudonym (r,p), it is possible to use the tree structure to efficiently
decode this pseudonym and discover the identity of the tag that generated this
pseudonym. The main idea is to use a depth-first search to find a pth in the tree that
matches the response p. When started at the root of the tree of secrets, at each node s, it is
possible to check whether entry p; matches the left child sO or the right child si by
verifying whether Fso (r)
=
pi or Fsi (r)
=
pi . When a pseudonym is presented to this
algorithm lets the TC to identify tag's real identity ID. Based on the identity of the tag,
the identity of the reader, and the privacy policy for tag, the TC can then decide whether
to reveal ID to the reader. This enables to provide a mechanism for enforcing a privacy
policy regarding which readers are allowed to learn which tag IDs.
4.4.3 Delegation
This protocol allows the TC to delegate access to a certain interval of
pseudonyms to an offline reader. Thus, allowing the reader to perform the mapping itself
from a pseudonym (r, p) to the tag's identity ID, only if the tag's counter value is within a
prescribed interval [L, R]. Each leaf of the tree corresponds to a different pseudonym for
a tag. To delegate access to leaves in an interval [L, R], the TC first determines the
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smallest set of tree nodes that cover the interval [L, R]. The trusted center sends a subtree
of the tree of secrets to the reader along with the tag's identity. Now, when the reader
sees the pseudonym (r,p), the reader no longer communicates with the trusted center.
Instead, it can perform a depth-first search to perform the mapping of the pseudonym to
the tag ID.
However, when the tag updates itself, the reader can no longer recognize any
subsequent pseudonyms from this tag. This update is usually done based on the tag
counter, so the subtree of secrets delegated to the reader will no longer be available. The
reader at this point must re-apply to the TC if it wants to continue access to the tag.
4.4.4 Ownership Transfer
Ownership transfer can be identified as when reader 1 gives RFID tag information
to reader2. When the ownership is transferred to reader2, there should be a mechanism to
prevent the access of the same tag from reader1.This is crucial for limiting the trust
amongst readers which would need to read tags at some point in the tag's lifetime. There
are two methods for ownership transfer. First method is soft killing, in this method when
reader2 queries the trusted center and learns how many leaves were delegated to reader 1
for example k, then reader2 reads the tag k + 1 times. The tag will then have updated past
readerl's access so it will no longer be able to disambiguate the tag's pseudonyms..
Second method is increasing the tag counter. Here reader2 is allowed to increase the
counter on the tag from c to c\ This is done by sending the tag a random seed r, after
which reader2 and the tag can perform mutual authentication and establish a secure
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channel with the shared secret. Reader2 sends c\ plus a proof that reader2 knows the
secret for the leaf c, to the tag over the secure channel. The tag checks that > c, so
reader2 can only increase the tag's counte and not decrease it. By doing so, reader2 can
"leapfrog"
the tag over readerl's delegated leaves and be sure that readerl can no longer
read the tag.
4.5 Avoid Replay Attack - Multiple Tag Reads
The pseudonym feature of the library RFID protocol makes is susceptible to
replay attacks as an adversary can use the same pseudonym again. This kind of replay
attacks can be avoided with the help of this algorithm suggested in [18]. When the reader
has been authenticated, it sends the request to query multiple tags simultaneously to the
TC, the TC then sends a random variable (r) which is associated with each of these tags
to the reader. Considering two tags Tag A (TA) and Tag B (TB), the TC needs to obtain
the proof (Pab) that both of these tags have been scanned within a pre-specified time limit
otherwise it will cancel the communication and would restart by sending a fresh r.
The algorithm works as shown in figure 4.3. The reader sends a "left proof to TA
(left tag) and it reacts by generating rA and sends it back to the reader. The reader along
with "right-proof forwards the information to TB (right tag). It in turn generates MAC
(mB) with a help of its secret key xB on r and rA . Then it sends back mB along with rB to
the reader. The reader then sends mB to TA. TA, uses xA to generate MAC (mA) using rB
and sends it back to the reader. The reader then creates proof PAB
=
(rA, rB, mA> mB) and






















Figure 4.3: Multiple Tag Reads
Here it is observed that the MAC generated by TB depends on both r and rA. The
use of rA in generating mB is crucial. Since rA is generated and used internally in TA for
generating mA as well, as adversary cannot run replay attack on either of these tags. The
use of mB in generating mA is crucial since TA has to wait for TB to generate mB.
Therefore, TA's part of the proof cannot occur before TB's part and TB's part can't happen
independently since it too is dependent on input from TB(rA). TA also generates rAiwhich
is kept internal.
4.6 Noisy tags and Distance bounding protocols
In addition to preventing replay attacks, there are other attacks like man-in the
middle attacks, passive attacks and terrorist attacks etc. To prevent these kinds of attack a
combinations of two protocols [16,17] is proposed to be included to library RFID security
system. [16] proposes the use of noisy tags that ensures the tag information sent is not
malicious and is included in the
readers'
field. [17] proposes that use of distance
bounding scheme that prevents various attacks imposed to the RFID environment.
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Noisy tags [16] are owned by the reader's manager and set out within the reader's
field. They are regular RFID tags that generate noise on the public channel between the
reader and the queried tag, such that the eavesdropper cannot differentiate the messages
sent by the queried tag from ones sent by the noisy tag. It provides an added security by
allowing the reader and tag to establish a secret key on-the fly.
After establishing a communication channel between the reader and tag, the
reader broadcasts a random nonce Nj. The noisy tag (NT) present in the reader's field
replies with a noisy code, ncodej. This code is generated using a pseudo-random function
applied to nonce N; and the secret key, K (ncodej = h(^|Nj). This code looks random to
the eavesdropper but can be easily computed by the reader. At the same time the real tag
responds with a random code codej. This generation of codes by both noisy tag and real
tag must be random such that the eavesdropper is not able to distinguish a code coming
from a noisy tag from a code coming from a real tag. Upon reception ofNj, the tag and
the noisy tag set a timer with a random value s [0; t], where t is the duration of a round.
At the end ofn rounds, the reader and the tag share n codes.
The usage of noisy tag in the
readers'
field prevents the "same
bit"
problem, since
the probability of the tag and the noisy tag selecting the same code is very small, and
therefore reduces the number of rounds to n. The tag and noisy tag can potentially send
several codes per rounds which makes the adversary analysis more difficult. The noisy
tag functionality can be distributed over several tags, i.e. several noisy tags can be used.
In this case, the reader shares a different secret key, K, with each of the noisy tag. When
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the reader broadcasts a random nonce N, all the noisy tags compute their corresponding
ncodes, ncode;
= h (Kj, Nf), and send them back to the reader. The reader can filter out the
codes sent by the noisy tags and recover the one sent by the legitimate tag. Using several
noisy tags increases the noisy codes diversity (power, frequency etc), thus making it more
difficult for adversary to identify codes from the ncodes. Thus, with the use of noisy tag
in the reader's field an agreement protocol is established between the reader and the tag
which provides resistance against passive adversaries. Because, it is mush easier to
perform a passive attack, in particular on the forward channel that is the channel from
readers to tags can be eavesdropped.
The distance bounding protocol [17] is symmetric key based and is resistant to
terrorist fraud and computationally efficient enough to be implemented in resource
constrained devices. The communication between the reader and the tag is parameterized
by the maximum challenge response time Atmax to prevent modification of tag
information by adversary. Both the tag and the reader use a key derivation function KDF
to derive a symmetric encryption key k, which is used to encrypt this shared secret s. The
range of both KDF and , is {0,
1}"
. KDF is pseudo-random, i.e. when s is a secret high
enough computational entropy, the output of the function is computationally
indistinguishable from uniformly random. A fast n-round challenge-response phase
begins shown in figure 4.4. At each round the
ith
bit of the ciphertext is returned when ai
= 0 and otherwise
i1
bit of the key k. The knowledge of k and c equivalent to knowing
the shared secret s, since s can also be derived using s
= Dk(c). The set of exchanges
44
between the tag and the reader should not exceed Atmax, because when it exceeds the max
time the reader (verifier) can reject the tag information. When it accepts the tag
information, the reader filters out ncodej by computing h (K||N;) and retrieves the code
sent by tag codej. For an eavesdropper, both code; and ncode; appears random so it will
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Figure 4.4: Distance Bounding Algorithm adopted from [17]
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4.7 Analysis of the authentication scheme
This pseudonym generation is based on the secret key that is stored on the tag and
known only to authorized readers, so that they can identify the tag. However, without
knowing the secret key, the pseudonym provides no information about the tag's identity.
They can't be linked with each other as a result it prevents unauthorized readers from
telling whether two pseudonyms came from the same tag or not. It is also important to be
able to specify privacy policy for each tag, restricting the access to only authorized
readers.
When a TC receives a request from some reader to decode a particular
pseudonym, it can decode the pseudonym by consulting the tag's privacy policy and
decide whether to reveal the tag's identity to this reader. This provides a security feature
that will allow delegating access only to specific readers. This scheme provides an
additional security by allowing time-limited delegation, which means that every
authorized reader will be allowed a fixed number of reads from the tag. The TC computes
a time-limited secret that provides the ability to disambiguate pseudonyms for a particular
tag for a limited number of times. This secret is communicated to the reader through a
secure channel, and for the next q tag-reads, the reader does not need to interact with the
TC in any way. After reading the tag q times, the reader loses the ability to link tag
readers and must contact the trusted center to ask for reauthorization. Using of
pseudonyms allows dealing with ownership transfer from one reader to the other. Once
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the reader is able to obtain the access to the tag, it establishes a secure channel between
the tag and the reader.
Other symmetric algorithms suggested [16], [17] and [18] enables security against
distance, mafia and terrorist fraud. The use of noisy tag in the reader's field an agreement
protocol is established between the reader and the tag that provides resistance against
passive adversaries. Because, it is mush easier to perform a passive attack, particular in
the forward channel (channel from readers to tags) can be eavesdropped. Using several
noisy tags increases the noisy codes diversity (power, frequency etc), thus making it more
difficult for adversary to identify codes from the ncodes. Distance bounding scheme
employs symmetric authentication techniques. It uses KDF as a pseudo-random function,
to add randomness to the RFID system. KDF could be replaced with a MAC algorithm.
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Chapter 5 Implementation ofRFID system
This chapter explains the implementation of library RFID system as described in [15]. It
implements generation of tags and secrets by the trusted center. It demonstrates the
implementation of actions performed like the reading of the tag by the reader and
decoding of the pseudonyms. This section would include the various algorithms used, the






Figure 5.1: Library RFID protocol Sketch
The above figure 5.1 shows the protocol sketch. The TC is the owner of all tags
and secrets in a RFID system. It enforces and specifies the privacy policy associated with
a tag. Thus, it is responsible for computing time-limited secret that provides the ability to
disambiguate pseudonyms for a particular tag for limited number of times.
5.1 Implementation Details
Consider an RFID system with a database ofN tags and each tag identified with a
leafof a binary tree. Each tag stores the tree of secrets from the root to the leafof the tree.
Each secret is different and randomly chosen 128-bit secret key. Each tag is associated
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with a leaf of the tree and knows the secret from the root to its leaf. The trusted center is
responsible for creating of secrets and number of tags required in a particular library
system. Thus, TC has the knowledge of all the secrets used in the RFID system. The
algorithm is broken into three parts:
1. Setup: Sets up the secrets and tags for the RFID system
2. Action
a. Reader sends a request to read the tag
b. Looking up of the pseudonym
3. Controlled Delegation
5.1.1 Setup
This section explains setting up of secrets and the tags by TC. As shown in Figure
5.2, the box "Setup
Secrets"
allows the user to enter the desired tree depth D of the binary
tree. Depth D = dl + d2, where dl is the depth of the tree with tags and d2 is depth of the
tree of secrets associated with each tag. Every node at depth dl corresponds to a unique
tag in the system. The user is prompted set the the tree Depth and tag depth. For example
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Figure 5.2: Setting up of Secrets
However, if the Tree Depth = 1 and Tag Depth
= 1, the number of secrets created per tag
will be 1, so less number of pseudonyms per tag. Thus, if tree depth > tag depth then the
number ofpseudonyms per tag increases, which increases security of the system.
In the Setup Tags, the application will confirm the number of tags have been
generated successfully based on the tree depth specified during the setup secrets phase.







Number of Tags: -|g
Tag Depth: 4
Generate
Tags have been generated successfully!
Figure 5.3: Setting up ofTags
5.1.2 Pseudonym Generation
Pseudonym generation is an important section of this library RFID protocol.
Pseudonyms correspond to the tree of secrets associated with each tag in the system.
Figure 5.4, shows a tree of secrets. Each tag S is associated with a randomly generated
128-bit secret key r. A pseudo-random function, for example, P
= PRF (SO, r) is applied
to each node at each level in the tree of secrets and a random number is generated for








Figure 5.4: Pseudonym Generation
5.1.3 Action
The action is divided into two sections. The first part demonstrates when the
reader attempts to read a tag and second part is the decoding ofpseudnyms.
5.1.3.1 Reading ofTag
Each tag keeps a counter. This counter identifies a leaf at level d of the tree, thus
this counter value will correspond to a new pseudonym for a particular tag. Every time a
reader attempts to read a tag, the tag generates a random 128-bit number r and a
pseudonym p. Whenever the tag increments its counter, it uses different path in the tree
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Figure 5.5: Reading of a Tag
when a reader attempts to read a tag. The output is the pseudonym generated by the tag.
The reader at this point does not know the identity of the tag. It needs to decode this
pseudonym to determine the identity of the tag.
5.1.3.2 Decoding ofPseudonyms
The second part demonstrates decoding of the pseudonyms. When a reader
receives a pseudonym, it sends it to the TC so that it can decode it. Since the TC is aware
of the tree structure, it is possible for it to efficiently decode the pseudonym and discover
the identity of the tag that generated the pseudonym. This part uses depth-first search to
find a path in the tree that matches the returned pseudonym (p;) from the read tag. We
start at the root of the tree of secrets. At each node s, we check whether the left child sO






p respectively. This way it is possible to determine the path in the trees that
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Figure 5.6: Decoding ofPseudonym
Figure 5.6, illustrates the decoding of the pseudonyms. The application outputs
the path in the tree of secret that matches the response p; pseudonym and hence the
identity of the tag is known. However, based on the identity of the tag, the identity of the




If a reader is online, then every time a tag is read it needs to send the pseudonym
to the TC in order to determine the tag identity. This kind of communication between the
reader and TC incurs communication cost on the RFID system whenever a tag is read.
This implementation assumes the reader to be offline. Thus, the TC will delegate a
limited number ofpseudonyms to the reader which inturn allow the reader to perform the
mapping of the pseudonym to the tag ID by itself.
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This tag has exceeded it's capacity for pseudonames!
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Figure 5.7: Controlled Delegation
Figure 5.7, shows the output that is generated from the application to indicate the
reader that the number of pseudonyms that was assigned to it has expired and it needs to




In Appendix F the code for the application is attached. This RFID protocol
provides privacy for the RFID tags. It ensures that a reader cannot determine the tag
identity or track a tag without the permission of the TC. Only authorized access can
determine the iderntity of a tag. Use of pseudonyms helps to handle vulnerabilities like
tracking and hotlisting. Without knowing the secret key associated with a tag knowing
the pseudonyms will not provide any information to unauthorized
readers'
about tag's
identity. In addition to that, these pseudonyms are unlinkable therefore, any unauthorized
reader cannot determine whether two pseudonyms belong to same tag or not. This
scheme involves one round of communication between the reader and the tag. Each tag
requires memory for the storage of the secret from the root to its leaf and for its counter.
The scheme exploits the scalability feature of binary tree, so each tag can be identified
with a logarithmic complexity ofO (log N).
This scheme also enables controlled/time-limited delegation that assumes an
offline reader and reduces the communication cost between the reader and TC every time
a tag is read. In addition to that, it reduces the exposure of secrets associated with a tag
when an adversary breaks into the reader. Only part of the secrets delegated to the reader
is lost in such conditions. However, it causes performance overhead on the
readers'
side
because the decoding of the pseudonyms to determine tag's indentity needs to be
performed by it.
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Figure 5.8, shows a graph of tree depth versus number of nodes in a system. Since
a binary tree is implemented as, we increase the depth of the tree, the number of nodes
increases and increase the complexity of the system. This complexity introduces
computational limitaions on low power RFID tags.
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Figure 5.8: Tree Depth versus number ofNodes
This suggests the implementation of trees whose branching factor is greater than 2. Using
trees with larger branching factor would not only reduce the tree depth it would also
reduce the tag storage and computation overhead.
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Figure 5.9: Pseudonyms per Tag versus tree depth.
This graph in figure 5.9 shows the number of pseudonyms per tag versus the tree
depth for each tag depth. A high number of pseudonyms can be maintained by keeping a
low tag depth and less number of tags in the system. Thus, there is a
tradeoffbetween the
number of tags and the number pseudonyms in the system. Increase in the number of
pseudonyms would incur storage overhead on TC as it is the owner of all tags and
pseudonyms in the RFID system.
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Chapter 6 Conclusion and Future Work
This thesis have identified authentication scheme in both extreme low power
wireless devices RFID and u-sensors. The authentication scheme implemented for u-
sensors successfully performs early detection of false data injected into the network. It
also makes sure that false data is not tranmitted across the network for more than t+1
nodes, where t is system level threshold determined on the basis of node density in a
network.
The detection of false data injected into the network was implemented
successfully using TOSSIM. The results obtained using the simulator was acceptable
although not similar to real hardware motes. MACs tranmitted during report endorsement
and enroute filtering phase is slow operation and incurs communication overhead.
Current library RFID tags do not prevent unauthorized reading of tag data.
Therefore, information such as title, author, shelf location, patron information, or last
checkin/checkout time should not be stored on library RFID tag under any circumstances.
At the same time, both tracking and hotlisting are possible whenever a static identifier is
used. Static identifiers as mentioned in earlier chapters are prone to collisions. The
pseudonym scheme provides privacy for tags in RFID system and makes the system less
susceptible to tracking and hotlisting.
However, the privacy of other tags degrades in this scheme if any tag is
compromised, because tags share their keying material. This sharing of key material
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appears essential to this proposed approach for obtaining logarithimic work for the
reader.
This library RFID application provides security against impersonation attack and
privacy against radio-only adversary. This is because each pseudonym emitted by a tag is
indistinguishable from other pseudonyms unless the secret keys associated with a tag are
known. This is because each tag has atleast one secret not shared with any other tag; to
perform successful non-replayed impersonation, the adversary would need to predict the
value of a PRF keyed with such a secret. Privacy, on the other hand, degrades under tag
compromise. This is because tags may share secrets in the tree of secrets. The amount of
degradation depends on the branching factor of the tree. Each deployment can pick the
branching factor that makes the best tradeoff between number of tags, number of
pseudonyms associated with each tag and reader complexity.
6.1 FutureWork
In u-sensors authentication scheme, the decision of an event made by the
nodes is considered a Boolean value. However, it could be based of some kind of
probability that is not considered in this
implementation. The scheme does not handle
generation of complex reports in case of a complex event. Authentication schemes could
be implemented to handle these.
The proposed protocol considers 13.56 Mhz RFID technology so it doesn't
considers the stringent limitations imposed by 915 Mhz tags like writing long-term state
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during a read, even a counter is difficult. In addition, depth-first search to determine tag's
identity incur lot of overhead that needs to be considered for future work in this area.
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0: Broadcast a Hello Message
1: Broadcast a Hello Message
2: Broadcast a Hello Message
3: Broadcast a Hello Message
4: Broadcast a Hello Message
5: Broadcast a Hello Message
6: Broadcast a Hello Message
7: Broadcast a Hello Message
8: Assign upper association node ids to cluster node 9
8: Assign upper association node ids to cluster node 10
8: Assign upper association node ids to cluster node 11
8: send an (CH) ack message to 7
7: send an (CH) ack message to 6
6: send an (CH) ack message to 5
5: send an (CH) ack message to 4
4: send an (CH) ack message to 3
3: send an (CH) ack message to 2
2: send an (CH) ack message to 1
10: start to compose an endorse message
10: send an endorsement to the cluster head 8
10: the event is: 1
9: start to compose an endorse message
9: send an endorsement to the cluster head 8
9: the event is: 1
1: send an (CH) ack message to 0
11: start to compose an endorse message
11: send an endorsement to the cluster head 8
11: the event is: 1
8: **CH receives an event from [11] **: 8: send an endorsement
ack to 11
8: The event is VALID $$$$
11: receive an ack for its endorsement message
10: did not receive an (endorsement) ack, retransmit its
endorsement
10: send an endorsement to the cluster head 8
10: the event is: 1
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8: **CH receives an event from [10] **: 8: send an endorsement
ack to 10
8: The event is VALID $$$$
10: receive an ack for its endorsement message
9: did not receive an (endorsement) ack, retransmit its
endorsement
9: send an endorsement to the cluster head 8
9: the event is: 1
8: **CH receives an event from [9] **: 8: send an endorsement ack
to 9
8: The event is VALID $$$$
9: receive an ack for its endorsement message
8: start to compose an endorse message
8: CH generates events itself ****
8 : send data after generating its own endorsement
8 : forward an data report to 7
7: receive an event 1 from 8 , currectly it is 0
7 : forward an data report to 6
6: receive an event 1 from 8 , currectly it is 0
6: forward an data report to 5
5: receive an event 1 from 8 , currectly it is 0
5 : forward an data report to 4
4 : receive an event 1 from 8 , currectly it is 0
4: forward an data report to 3
3: receive an event 1 from 8 , currectly it is 0
3: forward an data report to 2
2: receive an event 1 from 8 , currectly it is 0
2 : forward an data report to 1
1: receive an event 1 from 8 , currectly it is 0
1 : forward an data report to 0
0: receive an event 1 from 8 , currectly it is 0
0: **BS receives a valid event id [1] from cluster 0 $$$$$$$$$$




11: key sharing with
8: 216 218 105 128 23 205 166 54
key sharing with 9: 26 84 13 229 232 213 174 225
key sharing with 10
key sharing with 11
key sharing with 12
200 34 158 126 255 117 133 49
216 218 105 128 23 205 166 54
233 85 243 233 100 64 24 154
key sharing with


























key sharing with 8: 26 84 13 229 232 213 174 225
key sharing with
8: 200 34 158 126 255 117 133 49
key sharing with 8 107 198 179 121 114 94 62 122
key sharing with 9 73 82 82 187 51 10 67 209
key sharing with 10 103 22 219 155 132 181 51 160
key sharing with 11 82 23 235 131 91 16 20 250
Event [1], key: 151 30 26 128 204 69 35 174, computed XMAC
62 33 173
key shared with CH
the event is:
the event is :
the event is:
Event [1] , key
35 155 210
key shared with CH: 26 84
200 34 158 126 255 117 133 49
1, computed MAC with 8
1, computed MAC with 7
1, computed MAC with 6




98 124, computed XMAC





the event is: 1,
the event is: 1,
the event is: 1,
the event is: 1,
Event [1] , key:
163 84 44
key shared with CH: 216 218 105 128 23 205
the event is: 1, computed MAC with 8: 77
1, computed MAC with 7: 107
1, computed MAC: 77, attached MAC: 77
1, computed MAC: 242, attached MAC: 2 42
1, computed MAC: 198, attached MAC: 198
162 166 38 114 103 219 94 251, computed XMAC
computed MAC with 8
computed MAC with 7
computed MAC with 6
computed MAC with 5






Event [1] , key:
30 155 36 219
8 key shared wi th CH: 107 198 179 121 114
8 the event is : 1 computed MAC with 7 12
8 the event is : 1 computed MAC with 6 10
8 the event is : 1 computed MAC with 5 118
8 the event is : 1 computed MAC with 4 133
7 the event is : 1 computed MAC with 8 12
7 the event is : 1 computed MAC with 9 102
7 the event is : 1 computed MAC with 1(): 205
7 the event is : 1 computed MAC with i:L: 107
6 the event is : 1 computed MAC with 7 20
6 the event is : 1 computed MAC with 8 10
6 the event is : 1 computed MAC with 9 34
6 the event is : 1 computed MAC with 1(): 190
5 the event is : 1 computed MAC with 6 245
5 the event is : 1 computed MAC with 7 209
5 the event is : 1 computed MAC with 8 118
5 the event is : 1 computed MAC with 9 42
94 62 122
66
4 : the event
4 : the event
4 : the event
4 : the event
3 : the event
3 : the event
3 : the event
3 : the event
2 : the event
2 : the event
2 : the event
2 : the event
1 : the event
1 : the event
1 : the event












































































































8 114 103 219 94 251, computed XMAC
8 170 142 113 98 124, computed XMAC
128 204 69 35 174, computed XMAC
4 10 86 141 219 58, computed XMAC




00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 01 9a 00 00
0: Sending message: ffff, 5
ff ff 05 7d 0a 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
1: AM_address = ffff, 5; counter: 1
1: Received message:
ff ff 05 7d 0a 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00
1: AM_type = 5
1: Sending message: ffff, 5
ff ff 05 7d 0a 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
2: AM_address = ffff, 5; counter :1
2: Received message:
ff ff 05 7d 0a 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 7a ca 00 00
67
2 : AM_type = 5
2: Sending message: ffff, 5
ff ff 05 7d 0a 02 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 03 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0: AM_address = ffff, 5; counter :1
0: Received message:
ff ff 05 7d Oa 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 fa ca 00 00
0: AM_type = 5
3: AM_address = ffff, 5; counter :1
3: Received message:
ff ff 05 7d Oa 02 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 03 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 e7 09 00 00
3: AM_type = 5
3: Sending message: ffff, 5
ff ff 05 7d Oa 03 00 02 00 01 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
1: AM_address = ffff, 5; counter: 2
1: Received message:
ff ff 05 7d Oa 02 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 03 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 cd 09 00 00
1 : AM_type = 5
4: AM_address = ffff, 5; counter :1
4: Received message:
ff ff 05 7d Oa 03 00 02 00 01 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 51 3b 00 00
4 : AM_type = 5
4: Sending message: ffff, 5
ff ff 05 7d Oa 04 00 03 00 02 00 01 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
2: AM_address = ffff, 5; counter: 2
2: Received message:
ff ff 05 7d Oa 03 00 02 00 01 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 58 3b 00 00
2 : AM_type = 5
3: AM_address = ffff, 5; counter: 2
3: Received message:
ff ff 05 7d Oa 04 00 03 00 02 00 01 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 73 87 00 00
3: AM_type = 5
5: AM_address = ffff, 5; counter :1
5: Received message:
ff ff 05 7d Oa 04 00 03 00 02 00 01 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 f3 86 00 00
5 : AM_type = 5
5: Sending message: ffff, 5
68
ff ff 05 7d Oa 05 00 04 00 03 00 02 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
6: AM_address = ffff, 5; counter: 1
6: Received message:
ff ff 05 7d Oa 05 00 04 00 03 00 02 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 Id bb 00 00
6: AM_type = 5
6: Sending message: ffff, 5
ff ff 05 7d Oa 06 00 05 00 04 00 03 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
4: AM_address = ffff, 5; counter: 2
4: Received message:
ff ff 05 7d Oa 05 00 04 00 03 00 02 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 56 bb 00 00
4 : AM_type = 5
7: AM_address = ffff, 5; counter: 1
7: Received message:
ff ff 05 7d Oa 06 00 05 00 04 00 03 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 el e3 00 00
7 : AM_type = 5
7: Sending message: ffff, 5
ff ff 05 7d Oa 07 00 06 00 05 00 04 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
5: AM_address = ffff, 5; counter: 2
5: Received message:
ff ff 05 7d Oa 06 00 05 00 04 00 03 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 49 e4 00 00
AM_type = 5
AM_address = ffff, 5; counter: 2
Received message:
ff ff 05 7d Oa 07 00 06 00 05 00 04 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 f4 31 00 00
AM_type = 5
AM_address = ffff, 5; counter: 1
Received message:
ff ff 05 7d Oa 07 00 06 00 05 00 04 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 Od 32 00 00
8 : AM_type = 5
8: Sending message: 9, 6
09 00 06 7d Oa 08 00 07 00 06 00 05 00 04 fd 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
7: AM_address =9, 6; counter: 2
10: AM_address = 9, 6; counter :1
9: AM_address =9, 6; counter: 1
9: Received message:
69
09 00 06 7d Oa 08 00 07 00 06 00 05 00 04 fd 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 ab 79 00 00
9: AM_type = 6
11: AM_address =9, 6; counter :1
8: Sending message: a, 6
Oa 00 06 7d Oa 08 00 07 00 06 00 00 00 03 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 d7 db 00 00 01 00 eO 56 00 00
9: AM_address = a, 6; counter: 2
10: AM_address = a, 6; counter: 2
10: Received message:
0a 00 06 7d 0a 08 00 07 00 06 00 00 00 03 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 db b8 00 00
10: AM_type = 6
11: AM_address = a, 6; counter: 2
7: AM_address = a, 6; counter: 3
8: Sending message: b, 6
0b 00 06 7d 0a 08 00 07 00 00 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 92 23 00 00 01 00 d2 95 00 00
10: AM_address = b, 6; counter :1
11: AM_address = b, 6; counter: 3
11: Received message:
0b 00 06 7d 0a 08 00 07 00 00 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 8d 0a 00 00
11: AM_type = 6
7: AM_address = b, 6; counter: 4
AM_address = b, 6; counter: 3
Sending message: 7, 7
07 00 07 7d 12 08 00 09 00 0a 00 0b 00 04 00 08 00 09 00 0a 00 0b
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 be 33 00 00 01 00 84 e7 00 00
10: AM_address =7, 7; counter: 2
11: AM_address =7, 7; counter: 4
7: AM_address =7, 7; counter: 5
7: Received message:
07 00 07 7d 12 08 00 09 00 0a 00 0b 00 04 00 08 00 09 00 0a 00 0b
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 bf 36 00 00
7 : AM_type = 7
7: Sending message: 6, 7
06 00 07 7d 12 07 00 08 00 09 00 0a 00 04 00 08 00 09 00 0a 00 0b
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 8c 44 00 00 01 00 ad Oe 00 00
9: AM_address = 7,- 7; counter: 4
6: AM_address = 6, 7; counter: 3
6: Received message:
06 00 07 7d 12 07 00 08 00 09 00 0a 00 04 00 08 00 09 00 0a 00 0b
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 50 b4 00 00
6: AM_type = 7
6: Sending message: 5, 7
70
05 00 07 7d 12 06 00 07 00 08 0 0 09 00 04
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0 0 0 0 31 f7
8: AM address =6, 7, counter 2
7 AM address = 5, 7, counter 6
5 AM address =5, 7, counter 3
5 Received message:
05 00 07 7d 12 06 00 07 00 08 00 09 00 04
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0 0 00 01 0 0
5 AM type = 7
5 Sending message: 4, 7
04 00 07 7d 12 05 00 06 0 0 07 00 08
00 Ob 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0 0 00 00
00 00
4 AM address =4, 7, counter 1
4 Received message:
04 00 07 7d 12 05 00 06 00 07 00 08 00 0 4
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 0 0
4 AM type = 7
4 Sending message: 3, 7
03 00 07 7d 12 04 00 05 00 06 00 07 00 04
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0 0 f9 c9
6 AM address =4, 7 counter 4
5 AM address = 3, 7 counter 4
3 AM address =3, 7 counter 3
3 Received message:
o:3 00 07 7d 12 04 00 05 00 06 00 07 00 04
0() 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00
3 AM type = 7
3 Sending message: 2, 7
o:I 00 07 7d 12 03 00 04 00 05 00 06 00 04
0(D 00
00 08 00 09 00 0a 00 0b
00 00 01 00 02 cl 00 00
00 08 00 09 00 0a 00 0b
00 00 00 00 25 48 00 00
00 04 00 08 00 09 00 0a
d8 bf 00 00 01 00 Of 98
00 08 00 09 00 0a 00 0b
00 00 00 00 6a cl 00 00
00 08 00 09 00 0a 00 0b
00 00 01 00 2c 64 00 00
00 08 00 09 00 0a 00 0b
00 00 00 00 3f 3c 00 00
00 08 00 09 00 0a 00 0b




11: key sharing with 8
key sharing with 9:
key sharing with 10
key sharing with 11
key sharing with 12
key sharing with 8 :
key sharing with 8 :
216 218 105 128 23 205 166 54
26 84 13 229 232 213 174 225
200 34 158 126 255 117 133 49
216 218 105 128 23 205 166 54
233 85 243 233 100 64 24 154
245 21 142 51 164 145 35 135
26 84 13 229 232 213 174 225
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10: key sharing with
8: 200 34 158 126 255 117 133 49
7: key sharing with 8 107 198 179 121 114 94 62 122
7: key sharing with 9 73 82 82 187 51 10 67 209
7: key sharing with 10 103 22 219 155 132 181 51 160
7: key sharing with 11 82 23 235 131 91 16 20 250
0: Broadcast a Hello Message
1: Broadcast a Hello Message
2: Broadcast a Hello Message
3: Broadcast a Hello Message
4: Broadcast a Hello Message
5: Broadcast a Hello Message
6: Broadcast a Hello Message
7: Broadcast a Hello Message
8 : Assign upper association node ids to cluster node 9
8: Assign upper association node ids to cluster node 10
8: Assign upper association node ids to cluster node 11
8: send an (CH) ack message to 7
7: send an (CH) ack message to 6
6: send an (CH) ack message to 5
5: send an (CH) ack message to 4
4: send an (CH) ack message to 3
3: send an (CH) ack message to 2
2: send an (CH) ack message to 1
10: start to compose an endorse message
10: Event [1], key: 151 30 26 128 204 69 35 174, computed XMAC
217 62 33 173
10: key shared with CH: 200 34 158 126 255 117 133 49
10: the event is: 1, computed MAC with 8: 242
10: the event is: 1, computed MAC with 7: 205
10: the event is: 1, computed MAC with 6: 190
10: send an endorsement to the cluster head 8
10: the event is: 1
9: start to compose an endorse message
9: Event [1], key: 167 17 108 170 142 113 98 124, computed XMAC
40 35 155 210
9: key shared with CH: 26 84 13 229
232 213 174 225
9: the event is: 1, computed MAC with 8: 198
9: the event is: 1, computed MAC with 7: 102
9: the event is: 1, computed MAC with 6: 34
9: the event is: 1, computed MAC with 5: 42
9: send an endorsement to the cluster head 8
9: the event is: 1
1: send an (CH) ack message to 0
11: start to compose an endorse message
11: Event [1], key: 76 127 254 10 86 141 219 58, computed XMAC
243 163 84 44
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11: key shared with CH: 216 218 105 128 23 205 166 54
11: the event is: 1, computed MAC with 8: 77
11: the event is: 1, computed MAC with 7: 107
11: send an endorsement to the cluster head 8
11: the event is: 1
8: **CH receives an event from [11] **: 8: send an endorsement
ack to 11
8: the event is: 1, computed MAC: 77, attached MAC: 7 7
8: The event is VALID $$$$
11: receive an ack for its endorsement message
10: did not receive an (endorsement) ack, retransmit its
endorsement
10: send an endorsement to the cluster head 8
10: the event is: 1
8: **CH receives an event from [10] **: 8: send an endorsement
ack to 10
8: the event is: 1, computed MAC: 2 42, attached MAC: 2 42
8: The event is VALID $$$$
10: receive an ack for its endorsement message
9: did not receive an (endorsement) ack, retransmit its
endorsement
9: send an endorsement to the cluster head 8
9: the event is: 1
8: **CH receives an event from [9] **: 8: send an endorsement ack
to 9
the event is: 1, computed MAC: 198, attached MAC: 198
The event is VALID $$$$
receive an ack for its endorsement message
start to compose an endorse message
Event [1], key: 162 166 38 114 103 219 94 251, computed XMAC
30 155 36 219
key shared with CH: 107 198 179 121 114 94 62 122
the event is: 1, computed MAC with 7: 12
the event is: 1, computed MAC with 6: 10
the event is: 1, computed MAC with 5: 118
the event is: 1, computed MAC with 4: 133
CH generates events itself
****
send data after generating its own endorsement
forward an data report to 7
7 : receive an event 1 from 8 , currectly it is 0
7: the event is: 1, computed MAC with 8: 12
7: the event is: 1, computed MAC with 9: 102
7: the event is: 1, computed MAC with 10: 2 05
7: the event is: 1, computed MAC with 11: 107
7 : forward an data report to 6















































computed MAC with 6
computed MAC with 7
computed MAC with 8





the event is: 1, computed MAC with 7: 2 0
the event is: 1, computed MAC with 8: 10
the event is: 1, computed MAC with 9: 34
the event is: 1, computed MAC with 10: 190
forward an data report to 5
receive an event 1 from 8
, currectly it is 0
the event is: 1,
the event is: 1,
the event is: 1,
the event is: 1,
forward an data report to 4
receive an event 1 from 8
,
the event is: 1,
the event is: 1,
the event is: 1,
the event is: 1,
forward an data report to 3
receive an event 1 from 8 ,
the event is: 1,
the event is: 1,
the event is: 1,
the event is: 1,
forward an data report to 2
receive an event 1 from 8 ,
currectly it is 0
computed MAC with 5
computed MAC with 6
computed MAC with 7





currectly it is 0
computed MAC with 4
computed MAC with 5
computed MAC with 6










1, computed MAC with 3
1, computed MAC with 4
1, computed MAC with 5





forward an data report to 1
receive an event 1 from 8 , currectly it is 0
the event is: 1, computed MAC with 2
the event is: 1, computed MAC with 3
the event is: 1, computed MAC with 4
the event is: 1, computed MAC with 5
forward an data report to 0
receive an event 1 from 8
Event [1], key: 162 166 38
th 8: 30 155 36 219
Event [1] , key: 167 17 108
th 9: 40 35 155 210
Event [1], key: 151 30 26
th 10: 217 62 33 173
Event [1] , key: 76 127





, currectly it is 0
114 103 219 94 251,
170 142 113 98 124,
128 204 69 35 174,





CBS receives a valid event id [1] from cluster 0 $$$$$$$$$$
74







































key sharing with 8
key sharing with 9:
key sharing with 10
key sharing with 11





key sharing with 8 :
key sharing with 8 1
key sharing with 9 7
key sharing with 10
key sharing with 11
Broadcast a Hello Mes
Sending message: ffff
216 2













00 00 00 0
00 00 00 0
counter: 1
18 105 128 23 205 166 54
13 229 232 213 174 225
34 158 126 255 117 133 49
218 105 128 23 205 166 54
85 243 233 100 64 24 154
142 51 164 145 35 135
13 229 232 213 174 225
4 158 126 255 117 133 49
121 114 94 62 122
7 51 10 67 209
155 132 181 51 160
131 91 16 20 250
0 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00
0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 01 9a
ff 05 7d 0a 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00
AM_address = ffff, 5;
Received message:
ff 05 7d 0a 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00
AM_type = 5
Broadcast a Hello Message
Sending message: ffff, 5
00 00 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 00 00 00





ff 05 7d 0a 01 00
00 00 00 00 00 00
AM_address = ffff,
Received message:
ff 05 7d 0a 01 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00
AM_type = 5
Broadcast a Hello Mes
Sending message: ffff
ff 05 7d 0a 02 00 01
00 00 00 00 00 00 00
AM_address = ffff, 5;
Received message:
ff 05 7d 0a 01 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00
AM_type = 5





00 00 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 7a ca
sage
, 5
00 00 00 00 00 03 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
counter : 1
00 00 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 00 00 00












ff ff 05 7d Oa 02 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 03 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 e7 09 00 00
3: AM_type = 5
3: Broadcast a Hello Message
3: Sending message: ffff, 5
ff ff 05 7d Oa 03 00 02 00 01 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
1: AM_address = ffff, 5; counter: 2
1: Received message:
ff ff 05 7d 0a 02 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 03 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 cd 09 00 00
1 : AM_type = 5
4
4
AM_address = ffff, 5; counter: 1
Received message:
ff ff 05 7d 0a 03 00 02 00 01 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 51 3b 00 00
4 : AM_type = 5
4: Broadcast a Hello Message
4: Sending message: ffff, 5
ff ff 05 7d 0a 04 00 03 00 02 00 01 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
2: AM_address = ffff, 5; counter: 2
2: Received message:
ff ff 05 7d 0a 03 00 02 00 01 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 58 3b 00 00
2: AM_type = 5
3: AM_address = ffff, 5; counter: 2
3: Received message:
ff ff 05 7d 0a 04 00 03 00 02 00 01 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 73 87 00 00
3: AM_type = 5
5: AM_address = ffff, 5; counter :1
5: Received message:
ff ff 05 7d 0a 04 00 03 00 02 00 01 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 f3 86 00 00
AM_type = 5
Broadcast a Hello Message
, , Sending message: ffff, 5
ff ff 05 7d 0a 05 00 04 00 03 00 02 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
6: AM_address = ffff, 5; counter :1
6: Received message:
ff ff 05 7d 0a 05 00 04 00 03 00 02 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 Id bb 00 00
6: AM type = 5
76
6: Broadcast a Hello Message
6: Sending message: ffff, 5
ff ff 05 7d Oa 06 00 05 00 04 00 03 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
4: AM_address = ffff, 5; counter: 2
4: Received message:
ff ff 05 7d Oa 05 00 04 00 03 00 02 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 56 bb 00 00
4 : AM_type = 5
7: AM_address = ffff, 5; counter :1
7: Received message:
ff ff 05 7d 0a 06 00 05 00 04 00 03 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 el e3 00 00
AM_type = 5
Broadcast a Hello Message




ff ff 05 7d 0a 07 00 06 00 05 00 04 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
5: AM_address = ffff, 5; counter: 2
5: Received message:
ff ff 05 7d 0a 06 00 05 00 04 00 03 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 49 e4 00 00
5 : AM_type = 5
6: AM_address = ffff, 5; counter: 2
6: Received message:
ff ff 05 7d 0a 07 00 06 00 05 00 04 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 f4 31 00 00
AM_type = 5
AM_address = ffff, 5; counter :1
Received message:
ff ff 05 7d 0a 07 00 06 00 05 00 04 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 Od 32 00 00
AM_type = 5
Assign upper association node ids to cluster node 9
Sending message: 9, 6
09 00 06 7d 0a 08 00 07 00 06 00 05 00 04 fd 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
7: AM_address =9, 6; counter: 2
10: AM_address = 9, 6; counter :1
9: AM_address = 9, 6; counter :1
9: Received message:
09 00 06 7d 0a 08 00 07 00 06 00 05 00 04 fd 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 ab 79 00 00
9: AM_type = 6
11: AM_address =9, 6; counter :1
8: Assign upper association node ids to cluster node 10
77
8: Sending message: a, 6
Oa 00 06 7d Oa 08 00 07 00 06 00 00 00 03 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 d7 db 00 00 01 00 eO 56 00 00
9: AM_address = a, 6; counter: 2
10: AM_address = a, 6; counter: 2
10: Received message:
0a 00 06 7d Oa 08 00 07 00 06 00 00 00 03 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 db b8 00 00
10: AM_type = 6
11: AM_address = a, 6; counter: 2
7: AM_address = a, 6; counter: 3
Assign upper association node ids to cluster node 11
Sending message: b, 6
0b 00 06 7d 0a 08 00 07 00 00 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 92 23 00 00 01 00 d2 95 00 00
10: AM_address = b, 6; counter :1
11: AM_address = b, 6; counter: 3
11: Received message:
0b 00 06 7d 0a 08 00 07 00 00 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 8d 0a 00 00
11: AM_type = 6
7: AM_address = b, 6; counter: 4
9: AM_address = b, 6; counter: 3
send an (CH) ack message to 7
Sending message: 7, 7
07 00 07 7d 12 08 00 09 00 0a 00 0b 00 04 00 08 00 09 00 0a 00 0b
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 be 33 00 00 01 00 84 e7 00 00
10: AM_address =7, 7; counter: 2
11: AM_address =7, 7; counter: 4
7: AM_address =7, 7; counter: 5
7: Received message:
07 00 07 7d 12 08 00 09 00 0a 00 0b 00 04 00 08 00 09 00 0a 00 0b
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 bf 36 00 00
7: AM_type = 7
7: send an (CH) ack message to 6
7: Sending message: 6, 7
06 00 07 7d 12 07 00 08 00 09 00 0a 00 04 00 08 00 09 00 0a 00 0b
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 8c 44 00 00 01 00 ad Oe 00 00
9: AM_address =7, 7; counter: 4
6: AM_address =6, 7; counter: 3
6: Received message:
06 00 07 7d 12 07 00 08 00 09 00 0a 00 04 00 08 00 09 00 0a 00 0b
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 50 b4 00 00
6: AM_type = 7
6: send an (CH) ack message to 5
6: Sending message: 5, 7
78
05 00 07 7d 12 06 00 07 00 08 00 09 00 04 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 31 f7 00
8: AM_address =6, 7; counter: 2
7: AM_address =5, 7; counter: 6
5: AM_address =5, 7; counter: 3
5: Received message:
05 00 07 7d 12 06 00 07 00 08 00 09 00 04 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00
5: AM_type = 7
5: send an (CH) ack message to 4
5: Sending message: 4, 7
04 00 07 7d 12 05 00 06 00 07 00 08 00 04 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 d8 bf 00
4: AM_address =4, 7; counter :1
4: Received message:
04 00 07 7d 12 05 00 06 00 07 00 08 00 04 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00
4 : AM_type = 7
4: send an (CH) ack message to 3
4: Sending message: 3, 7
03 00 07 7d 12 04 00 05 00 06 00 07 00 04 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f9 c9 00
6: AM_address =4, 7; counter: 4
5: AM_address =3, 7; counter: 4
3: AM_address =3, 7; counter: 3
3: Received message:
03 00 07 7d 12 04 00 05 00 06 00 07 00 04 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00
3 : AM_type = 7
3: send an (CH) ack message to 2
3: Sending message: 2, 7
02 00 07 7d 12 03 00 04 00 05 00 06 00 04 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 84 2a 00
2: AM_address =2, 7; counter: 3
2: Received message:
02 00 07 7d 12 03 00 04 00 05 00 06 00 04 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00
2 : AM_type = 7
2: send an (CH) ack message to 1
2: Sending message: 1, 7
01 00 07 7d 12 02 00 03 00 04 00 05 00 04 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 83 51 00
4: AM_address =2, 7; counter: 2
10: start to compose an endorse message
10: Event [1], key: 151 30 26 128 204 69 35
217 62 33 173
08 00 09 00 0a 00 0b
00 01 00 02 cl 00 00
08 00 09 00 0a 00 0b
00 00 00 25 48 00 00
08 00 09 00 0a 00 0b
00 01 00 Of 98 00 00
08 00 09 00 0a 00 0b
00 00 00 6a cl 00 00
08 00 09 00 0a 00 0b
00 01 00 2c 64 00 00
08 00 09 00 0a 00 0b
00 00 00 3f 3c 00 00
08 00 09 00 0a 00 0b
00 01 00 11 18 00 00
08 00 09 00 0a 00 0b
00 00 00 6c b9 00 00
08 00 09 00 0a 00 0b










key shared with CH: 200 34 158 126 255 117 133 49
the event is: 1, computed MAC with 8: 2 42
the event is: 1, computed MAC with 7: 205
the event is: 1, computed MAC with 6: 190
send an endorsement to the cluster head 8
the event is: 1
Sending message: 8, 8
08 00 08 7d 10 00 00 0a 00 01 00 00 00 d9 3e 21 ad f2 cd be 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
9: start to compose an endorse message
9: Event [1], key: 167 17 108 170 142 113 98 124, computed XMAC
40 35 155 210
9: key shared with CH: 26 84 13 229 232 213 174 225
9: the event is: 1, computed MAC with 8: 198
9: the event is: 1, computed MAC with 7: 102
9: the event is: 1, computed MAC with 6: 34
9: the event is: 1, computed MAC with 5: 42
9 : send an endorsement to the cluster head 8
9: the event is: 1
9: Sending message: 8, 8
08 00 08 7d 10 00 00 09 00 01 00 00 00 28 23 9b d2 c6 66 22 2a 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
1: AM_address =1, 7; counter: 3
1: Received message:
01 00 07 7d 12 02 00 03 00 04 00 05 00 04 00 08 00 09 00 0a 00 0b
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 61 37 00 00
AM_type = 7
send an (CH) ack message to 0
Sending message: 0, 7
00 00 07 7d 12 01 00 02 00 03 00 04 00 04 00 08 00 09 00 0a 00 0b
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ae 94 00 00 01 00 b3 a7 00 00
AM_address =1, 7; counter: 4
AM_address =0, 7; counter: 2
Received message:
00 00 07 7d 12 01 00 02 00 03 00 04 00 04 00 08 00 09 00 0a 00 0b
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 86 ad 00 00
0: AM_type = 7
2: AM_address =0, 7; counter: 4
11: start to compose an endorse message
11: Event [1], key: 76 127 254 10 86 141 219 58,
computed XMAC
243 163 84 44
11: key shared with CH: 216 218 105 128 23 205 166
54
11: the event is: 1, computed MAC with 8: 77
11: the event is: 1, computed MAC with 7: 107
11: send an endorsement to the cluster head 8
11: the event is: 1
80
11: Sending message: 8, 8
08 00 08 7d 10 00 00 Ob 00 01 00 00 00 f3 a3 54 2c 4d 6b 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
8: AM_address =8, 8; counter :1
8: Received message:
08 00 08 7d 10 00 00 Ob 00 01 00 00 00 f3 a3 54 2c 4d 6b 00 00 3d
96 f4 6f 67 2a ad ba af 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 2c 49 00 00
8 : AM_type = 8
8: **CH receives an event from [11] **: 8: send an endorsement
ack to 11
8: Sending message: b, 9
0b 00 09 7d 02 08 00 09 00 0a 00 0b 00 04 00 08 00 09 00 0a 00 0b
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 80 e4 00 00 01 00 b6 13 00 00
the event is: 1, computed MAC: 77, attached MAC: 77
The event is VALID $$$$
7: AM_address = b, 9; counter :1
11: AM_address = b, 9; counter :1
11: Received message:
0b 00 09 7d 02 08 00 09 00 0a 00 0b 00 04 00 08 00 09 00 0a 00 0b
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 8b c6 00 00
11: AM_type = 9
11: receive an ack for its endorsement message
10: AM_address = b, 9; counter :1
9: AM_address = b, 9; counter :1
10: did not receive an (endorsement) ack, retransmit its
endorsement
10: send an endorsement to the cluster head 8
10: the event is: 1
10: Sending message: 8, 8
08 00 08 7d 10 00 00 0a 00 01 00 00 00 d9 3e 21 ad f2 cd be 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 Od 06 00 00 00 00 89 35 00 00
8: AM_address =8, 8; counter: 2
8: Received message:
08 00 08 7d 10 00 00 0a 00 01 00 00 00 d9 3e 21 ad f2 cd be 00 3d
96 f4 6f 67 2a ad ba af 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 e6 6b 00 00
8: AM_type = 8
8: **CH receives an event from [10] **: 8: send an endorsement
ack to 10
8: Sending message: a, 9
0a 00 09 7d 02 08 00 09 00 0a 00 0b 00 04 00 08 00 09 00 0a 00 0b
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 69 7f 00 00 01 00 44 a3 00 00
the event is: 1, computed MAC: 242, attached MAC: 242
The event is VALID $$$$
7: AM_address = a, 9; counter: 2
10: AM_address = a, 9; counter:2
10: Received message:
81
Oa 00 09 7d 02 08 00 09 00 Oa 00 Ob 00 04 00 08 00 09 00 Oa 00 Ob
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 39 e9 00 00
10: AM_type = 9
10: receive an ack for its endorsement message
9: AM_address = a, 9; counter: 2
9: did not receive an (endorsement) ack, retransmit its
endorsement
9: send an endorsement to the cluster head 8
9: the event is: 1
9: Sending message: 8, 8
08 00 08 7d 10 00 00 09 00 01 00 00 00 28 23 9b d2 c6 66 22 2a 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 8b 2a 00 00 00 00 09 74 00 00
8: AM_address =8, 8; counter :1
8: Received message:
08 00 08 7d 10 00 00 09 00 01 00 00 00 28 23 9b d2 c6 66 22 2a 3d
96 f4 6f 67 2a ad ba af 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 e4 c6 00 00
8 : AM_type = 8
8: **CH receives an event from [9] **: 8: send an endorsement ack
to 9
8: Sending message: 9, 9
09 00 09 7d 02 08 00 09 00 0a 00 0b 00 04 00 08 00 09 00 0a 00 0b
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 08 c7 00 00 01 00 f2 c5 00 00
8: the event is: 1, computed MAC: 198, attached MAC: 198
8: The event is VALID $$$$
10: AM_address =9, 9; counter :1
11: AM_address =9, 9; counter :1
7: AM_address =9, 9; counter: 3
9: AM_address =9, 9; counter: 3
9: Received message:
09 00 09 7d 02 08 00 09 00 0a 00 0b 00 04 00 08 00 09 00 0a 00 0b
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 4f 40 00 00
9: AM_type = 9
9: receive an ack for its endorsement message
start to compose an endorse message
Event [1], key: 162 166 38 114 103 219 94 251, computed XMAC
30 155 36 219
key shared with CH: 107 198 179 121 114 94 62 122
the event is: 1, computed MAC with 7: 12
the event is: 1, computed MAC with 6: 10
the event is: 1, computed MAC with 5: 118
the event is: 1, computed MAC with 4: 133
CH generates events itself
****
send data after generating its own endorsement
forward an data report to 7
Sending message: 7, a
82
07 00 Oa 7d 10




7 : Received me
07 00 Oa 7d 10
00 00 00 00 00
7: AM_type = 1
7 : receive an
7 : the event i
7 : the event i
7 : the event i
7 : the event i
7 : forward an
7 : Sending mes
06 00 Oa 7d 10





06 00 Oa 7d 10
00 00 00 00 00
6 : AM_type = 1
6: receive an
6 : the event i
6 : the event i
6 : the event i
6: the event i
6: forward an
6: Sending mes
05 00 0a 7d 10




05 00 0a 7d 10
00 00 00 00 00
5: AM_type = 1
5: receive an
5 : the event i
5 : the event i
5 : the event i
5: the event i
5 : forward an
00 00 08 00 01 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 8a
=7, a; counter :1
=7, a; counter: 1
=7, a; counter : 1
ssage :
00 00 08 00 01 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01
lc 25 ca 88 cc 96 5c 85 0b
If 00 00 01 00 08 Id 00 00
0
event 1 from 8 , currect
s: 1, computed MAC with 8
s: 1, computed MAC with 9
s: 1, computed MAC with 1
s: 1, computed MAC with 1
data report to 6
sage: 6, a
00 00 08 00 01 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 c3
=7, a; counter :1
= 6, a; counter: 1
=6, a; counter :1
ssage :
00 00 08 00 01 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01
0
event 1 from 8 , currect
s: 1, computed MAC with 7
s: 1, computed MAC with 8
s: 1, computed MAC with 9
s: 1, computed MAC with 1
data report to 5
sage: 5, a
00 00 08 00 01 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0b
=5, a; counter: 2
=5, a; counter: 1
ssage :
00 00 08 00 01 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01
0
event 1 from 8 , currect
s: 1, computed MAC with 6
s: 1, computed MAC with 7
s: 1, computed MAC with 8
s: 1, computed MAC with 9
data report to 4
lc 25 ca 88 cc 96 5c 85 0b
00 00 00 00 00 6b Od 00 00





lc 25 ca 88 82 8d 7d 53 0b
a6 00 00 01 00 09 91 00 00
lc 25 ca 88 82 8d 7d 53 Ob
00 00 00 00 00 42 79 00 00





lc 25 ca 88 78 11 62 a4 0b








88 78 11 62 a4 0b
00 00 4d 02 00 00
0
83
5: Sending message: 4, a
04 00 Oa 7d 10 00 00 08 00 01 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
4: AM_address = 4, a; counter :1
4: Received message:




















the event is: 1,
the event is: 1,
the event is: 1,
the event is: 1,
forward an data report to 3
Sending message: 3, a
03 00 0a 7d 10 00 00 08 00 01 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
6: AM_address =4, a; counter :1
5: AM_address =3, a; counter: 2
3: AM_address =3, a; counter :1
3: Received message:
03 00 0a 7d 10 00 00 08 00 01 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
3: AM_type =10
3 : receive an event 1
3: the event is: 1,
3: the event is: 1,
3: the event is: 1,
3: the event is: 1,
3: forward an data report to 2
3: Sending message: 2, a
02 00 0a 7d 10 00 00 08 00 01 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
2: AM_address =2, a; counter :1
2: Received message:
02 00 0a 7d 10 00 00 08 00 01 00

















88 d3 a8 3b 29 0b
01 00 6f 9e 00 00
88 d3 a8 3b 29 0b






88 3e 47 64 e7 0b




















88 3e 47 64 e7 0b
00 00 2b 15 00 00
0
AM_type =10
receive an event 1 from 8
the event is: 1, computed MAC
the event is: 1, computed MAC
the event is: 1, computed MAC
the event is: 1, computed MAC
forward an data report to 1



















88 ed 7a 49 00 0b
01 00 f5 95 00 00
88 ed 7a 49 00 0b
00 00 le 89 00 00
0
84
01 00 Oa 7d 10 00 00 08 00 01 00 00 00
00 Ob 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 cl
00 00
4: AM_address =2, a; counter: 2
1: AM_address =1, a; counter :1
1: Received message:
01 00 Oa 7d 10 00 00 08 00 01 00 00 00 lc 25
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00
1: AM_type =10
1: receive an event 1 from 8 , currectly it is 0
1: the event is: 1, computed MAC with 2: 17 9
1: the event is: 1, computed MAC with 3: 30
1: the event is: 1, computed MAC with 4: 77
1: the event is: 1, computed MAC with 5: 41
1: forward an data report to 0
1: Sending message: 0, a
00 00 0a 7d 10 00 00 08 00 01 00 00 00 lc 25
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ef b4 00
3: AM_address =1, a; counter: 2
0: AM_address = 0, a; counter :1
0: Received message:
00 00 0a 7d 10 00 00 08 00 01 00 00 00 lc 25
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00
0: AM_type =10
0: receive an event 1 from 8 , currectly it
0: Event [1], key: 162 166 38 114 103 219 94
30 155 36 219
key: 167 17 108 170 142
lc 25 ca 88 c9 f9 00
0a 00 00 01 00 10 14
with 8: -
0: Event [1], 113 98
with 9: 40 35 155 210
0: Event [1], key: 151 30 26 128 204 69 35 1
with 10: 217 62 33 173
0: Event [1], key: 76 127 254 10 86 141 219
with 11: 243 163 84 44
0: **BS receives a valid event id [1] from c
ca 88 c9 f9 00 00 0b
00 00 00 55 15 00 00
ca 88 71 00 00 00 0b
00 01 00 5b 8a 00 00
ca 88 71 00 00 00 0b







Appendix F: Code for implementation of library RFID system
Here is the code for the algorithms used for the implementation of the library RFID
system.
// Creation of the Tag, Secrets in the binary tree
85







data = gcnew DATA;
data->nDepth = nDepth;
data->nValue = nodeVal;





// Check the limit
Int32 nTreeDepth = Decimal :: ToInt32
(this->nudTreeDepth-
>Value) ;
if ( nDepth >= nTreeDepth )
return; // No more siblings
// Each node has two siblings on the next depth level
GenerateNodes (nDepth+1, (nodeVal << 1), bw, random);




// Reading of the tags by Reader










MessageBox: : Show ("You must select a tag first!");
return;
}











= strSel->Remove (strSel->IndexOf (":")) ;
Int32 nTheTagNum = Convert :: ToInt32 (strSel) ;
Int32 nCounter = 0;
for each
(TAGSA











if ( theTag->nCounter > m_nPseudo ) // More than
allowable number of pseudonyms
{




// Now generate the pseudonyms
String"
strPseudo = GeneratePseudonym (theTag) ;
// Show it to user
if ( ! String: : IsNullOrEmpty (strPseudo) )
{
MessageBox: : Show (strPseudo) ;
// Update our array
for each
(TAGS"
tags in m_TagsList )
{


















fPseudoName = gcnew FileStream(strPseudoName,










System: : Text ::
StringBuilder"
strBld = gcnew





r = gcnew array<Byte> (16) ; // 128-bit random
number
random->GetBytes (r) ;
// Cook it with strong value of the tag
strBld->Append (ArrayConvertToString (r) ) ;
strBld->Append (ArrayConvertToString (tags->arrSecrets) ) ;
// Store the pseudoname to the file
BinaryWriter"





fPseudoName->Close ( ) ;
return strBld->ToString ( ) ;
}
// Pseudonym Lookup Code







System: : Text ::
StringBuilder"
strPathBld = gcnew
System: :Text: : StringBuilder;
int k = 0;
array<Byte>"
arrSecret = gcnew array<Byte> (16) ;
for ( int n = 16; n < (m_nSecrets) *16; n=n+16 ) // The 1st
16 bytes is equal to r
{
Array :: Copy (m_arrSecrets, n, arrSecret, 0, 16);
// Look this up in secrets table
for ( int m
= k; m < m_SecretList->Length; m++ )
{
if ( ArrayConvertToString (m_SecretList [m]
-
>arrKey)












strPathBld->Remove (strPathBld->Length-l, 1) ;
String"
strMsg
= "The path to the Tag for this pseudoname
is
"
+ strPathBld->ToString () ;
MessageBox: : Show (strMsg) ;
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